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Abstract 
In the last decade, East Asia has engaged in constructing numerous mechanisms to 
enhance regional cooperation in the areas of trade and finance. However, the region’s 
economic architecture exhibits certain idiosyncrasies such as an eclectic institutional 
structure and a limited level of commitment shown by its members. These idiosyncrasies 
seem to prevent regional cooperation from becoming deeper and more coherent. This paper 
focuses on the political factors that have thus far shaped the institutional form of East Asian 
regional trade and financial cooperation, particularly in the three essential aspects of 
regionalism derived from the theories of regional institution building. The first aspect is the 
level at which governments are willing to compromise sovereignty and political autonomy for 
the sake of regional cooperation. The second is the progress in creating mechanisms 
through which the “losers” and the “weak” within a country or region can be compensated. 
The third is the clear definition of which members can benefit from such mechanisms. These 
three elements are useful in furthering regional cooperation and institution building by 
removing resistance and obstacles that work against functional spillovers. 
The paper argues that East Asia’s economic institutions established through the cooperation 
efforts of the last ten years exhibit different qualities from those that have emerged in Europe, 
and thus fall far short of overcoming unexpected political tensions in the region. These 
deficiencies, however, contrast in two important fields of regional integration. In finance, the 
clearly defined member governments have difficulty compromising their respective national 
macroeconomic policy autonomy, while in the field of regional trade cooperation, the 
challenge is in redistributing the economic gains to those who stand to lose during the 
process of integration, or to the countries that have a long distance to catch up within a 
relatively well-defined group. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, East Asia has engaged in constructing numerous mechanisms to 
enhance regional cooperation, especially in the areas of trade and finance.
1 Given the 
usually path-dependent nature of institution building, it is striking that after almost fifty years 
of very limited regional cooperation from the end of World War II to the mid-1990s, the 
regional efforts have started to bloom all at once in the last ten years or so. East Asia’s 
regional economic architecture as it currently stands, however, exhibits idiosyncrasies such 
as an eclectic institutional structure and a limited level of commitment by the member states. 
These idiosyncrasies, according to the established view on the evolution of regionalism, 
seem to prevent regional cooperation from becoming deeper and more coherent. This paper 
focuses on the political factors at various levels that have thus far shaped the institutional 
form of East Asian regional economic cooperation in trade and finance, in particular 
examining the three essential aspects of regionalism derived from analysis of the European 
Union (EU), which is arguably the most advanced and successful example thus far of 
regional institution building.
2 By examining the nascent regional institutional evolution in East 
Asia from the perspective established by Europe, not only is it possible to understand the 
political challenges involved in regional cooperation but it is also possible to outline 
alternative or supplementary paths toward regional cooperation and institution building for 
Asia. 
Some discussion on the definition of often-used terms is in order at this point. In this paper, a 
conscious distinction is made first between “regionalism” and “regionalization,” where 
regionalism represents a policy-guided process of conscious regional integration, while 
regionalization is a bottom-up process of regional integration led by private sector business 
activities and subnational communication through people’s activities such as migration. 
Second, and in relation to the first distinction, the term “regional economic integration” is 
used to mean that there is some level of sovereignty pooling taking place in the area of 
cross-border movements of people, goods, and services. In that sense, regional integration 
is part of a stronger commitment by the participating governments. On the other hand, the 
term “regional cooperation” constitutes a part of regionalism, where conscious policies are 
adopted in favor of cooperation within the region to consciously facilitate regional 
arrangements. Third, “regional architecture” or “regional institution building” is a form of 
regional cooperation with the specific goal to form formal or informal regional institutions. 
Formal institutions tend to include a higher level of commitment, while informal institutions 
tend to constitute a large part of regional cooperation. Thus, in my view, regional institutions 
do not necessarily have to be formal, with headquarters and dedicated staff, but instead can 
be arrangements consisting of firm commitments made by the participating governments. 
Finally, the terms “political” and “politics” in the paper are used to mean the pursuit of power 
and influence either domestically or among governments, which encompasses elements 
broader than the narrow definition of national security or strategic interaction among states. 
Therefore, it is not only examples such as the Sino-Japanese rivalry, but also the politics 
behind tactics such as lobbying that shape government’s choices in engaging in regional 
cooperation. In short, this study focuses on the decisions and actions taken by the leaders 
and governments in East Asia (i.e., regionalism/regional cooperation) in pursuit of regional 
institution building, both formal and informal, and the politics involved in such decisions and 
actions are understood to be much broader than the inter-national pursuit of power. 
                                                  
1 In this paper, East Asia is considered to be the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three 
(People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and Japan). 
2 The purpose of this analysis is not to compare East Asia with Europe. Nonetheless, since Europe has the most 
developed regional cooperation scheme, and the literature on the political economy of regional cooperation is 
most advanced in examining the European case, the study takes those theories as its benchmark. 
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This study first summarizes various interpretations of the actions taken post-World War II 
that prevented East Asian regionalism from taking a clear shape until well into the 1990s. 
Second, the study discusses the sources of the sudden rise of East Asia’s regionalism in the 
late 1990s, when regional economic integration began to take an institutional form. This 
study also identifies, from a theoretical perspective derived from the European experience, 
which political elements are essential in making regional cooperation more self-sustaining. 
After analyzing the institutional form of regional cooperation in East Asia that has developed 
in the last ten years in the third section, the study assesses how these elements of the 
political factors work to constrain or promote the strengthening and growth of regional 
cooperation. Instead of identifying the one most plausible political factor in shaping the 
regional institutional arrangement, the study errs on the side of being comprehensive and 
identifies the possibilities of how those key political factors operate at domestic, regional, 
and international level. 
In sum, the study argues that the regional economic institutions established through the 
cooperation efforts of the last ten years in East Asia exhibit different qualities from those that 
have emerged in Europe, and thus fall far short of overcoming unexpected political tensions 
in the region. These deficiencies, however, contrast in two important fields of regional 
integration—finance and trade. In finance, the clearly defined member governments have 
difficulty compromising the autonomy of their respective national macroeconomic policies; 
while in the field of regional trade cooperation, the challenge is in the redistribution of 
economic gains to those who stand to lose in the process of integration or to the countries 
that are less developed economically. 
2.  EAST ASIA WITHOUT A REGIONAL FRAMEWORK: 
PATH-DEPENDENCE AND POWER CONFIGURATION 
Post-independence East Asia does not have a tradition of cooperation within a regional 
framework.
3 The European experience, with its developed regional institutions, can often be 
more of an exception than a rule,
4 and the level of regional cooperation efforts in East Asia 
until very recently has been low. The comparative and theoretical understanding of the 
relative absence of a regional framework in East Asia can be largely derived from two 
sources. The first source is the historical institutionalism of path-dependent evolution, while 
the second source is a power-based realist explanation. 
Institutions are path-dependent. That is “once a country or region has started down a 
[particular] track, the costs of reversal are very high” (Levi 1997: 28). The cost of reversal 
increases because “the relative benefits of the current activities compared with [the] once-
possible options [have] increased over time” (Pierson 2004: 21). This is a source of positive 
feedback for a particular path or institution and it is only at “critical junctures” that those 
paths and institutions are put in a distinctive direction.
5 
In Europe and Asia, the end of World War II set in motion regional configuration that has had 
lasting effects. The politico-economic arrangements that emerged in the aftermath of the 
                                                  
3 The only exception, of course, is ASEAN, which was established in 1967 as a political association in the face of 
the Viet Nam War. After the end of the Cold War, the focal point of ASEAN turned to free trade and industrial 
cooperation. This paper, however, does not focus on ASEAN because regional cooperation in East Asia is 
defined with at least the three Northeast Asian countries (People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and 
Japan) included. ASEAN as well as regional integration efforts such as Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) and 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are considered subregional cooperation in this paper. 
4 Baldwin (2008: 29) recently discussed that the world has relatively little to learn from the European integration 
experiences because “[the] EU started its life in circumstances…almost unimaginable in today’s world.” 
5 “Critical juncture” is defined by Collier and Collier (1991) as a period of fundamental political reorientation in 
which countries are set on distinct trajectories of change. 
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war’s devastation in both regions could not, however, have been any more contrasting. In 
Western Europe, regional integration, particularly between the major enemies of (West) 
Germany and France, became the focal point of the war recovery. On the regional level, 
European leaders were actively involved in region-building from the very beginning of the 
recovery, as seen in the process of establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951. On the global level, Western Europe was integrated as an important unit into the US-
led global politico-security regime. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO since 
1949) and Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (since 1948) were both created 
at quite an early stage of Europe’s recovery from the war and at the onset of the Cold War, 
and both those institutions are multi-member institutions that incorporated major European 
countries.
6 Even the American continent semi-succeeded in “inward-looking” integration 
efforts, which established Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960 replaced 
by Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980. Also the Andean Pact (which was 
renamed Andean Community) was established in 1969. On the East Asian side, however, 
not only did the colonizers of Europe, from the British to French to Dutch, came back to 
reclaim their former territories after Japan’s total defeat, but also the security and economic 
arrangements that emerged post-independence took mainly bilateral form (often called “San 
Francisco System”) including the hub-and-spoke alliance and preferential trading (and 
foreign aid) arrangements with the United States, and bilateral reparation arrangements with 
Japan.
7 
Different institutional formation in Europe (regional and multilateral) and in East Asia 
(bilateral and eclectic) emerged from distinct US policies with regards to those two regions. 
Comparing the US security arrangements of the two regions, Hemmer and Katzenstein 
(2002) argue that the combination of the high threat perception in Europe and better 
understanding and stronger identification with the Europeans by the US policymakers led the 
United States to allow multilateral arrangements in Europe but not in Asia. East Asia also 
missed an early opportunity post-World War II to create multilateral arrangements in the 
region. Analyzing the critical junctures that led to the organization gap of East Asia, Calder 
and Ye (2004) conclude that the sudden intensification of the Korean War with the entry of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the conflict helped establish the San Francisco 
system without any regional organization in East Asia.
8 
Power configuration, on the other hand, can determine whether or not integration and 
cooperation in a certain region is possible and whether it will proceed smoothly. Realists, 
who believe in the fundamental influence of the states’ power in a world devoid of a supra-
national governing authority, have seen East Asia as a place of instability and conflict due to 
its rapidly changing power configuration and inherent multi-power system, especially in 
comparison to Europe (Friedberg 2000). East Asia is also seen as an environment where 
institutions, which tend to lock-in a certain power balance, are less likely to emerge. In fact, 
Grieco (1997) compares three regions of the world—Europe, Latin America, and East Asia—
and concludes that the rapid pace of the “relative power shift” among the major powers in 
East Asia makes the region the least likely place for regional institutions to emerge or stick. 
                                                  
6 NATO is a military alliance between Western European states and the US with a system of collective defense. 
The Organisation of European Economic Cooperation was an international organization that preceded the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (since 1961), which was originally established to 
administer the US foreign aid channeled to Western Europe through the Marshall Plan. 
7 The only possible multilateral security efforts parallel to Europe is Southeast Asian Treaty Organization that was 
established in 1954. Not only did it include very few East Asian countries (Thailand and the Philippines), but it 
also included many outside members such as Pakistan, France, Suriname, and United Kingdom. The 
organization dissolved in 1977. 
8 The Korean War quickly triggered the formation of the San Francisco system because of the need to rapidly 
conclude peace with Japan, preempting local nationalism, and to allay the financial fears of the US congress. The 
pace did not allow for any focal point to emerge in the construction of regional politico-economic architecture in 
the Pacific (Calder and Ye 2004). 
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Furthermore, given the complexity of the Cold War dynamics in East Asia, the global 
hegemon, the US, long preferred to deal with the region through bilateral channels. It was 
only after the waning of the US hegemonic power that East Asia started to see nascent 
regional institutions (Crone 1993). 
History and power configuration have never provided East Asia with a suitable environment 
in which to launch regional cooperation within an institutional framework. Thus, it is quite 
striking to see the recent developments in regional institution building. The underlying factors 
from the late 1980s that have contributed to this change include (a) the end of the Cold War, 
which minimized the Cold War divide in the region, (b) the rapid economic growth of many of 
the countries in the region and the associated economic liberalization, and (c) the 
democratization of many countries in the region and the associated social maturity and 
increased flow of information. In addition, the growth of informal economic regionalization 
through the regional production network led by Japanese firms (Hatch and Yamamura 1996) 
and the ethnic Chinese business network (Peng 2000) has established a critical foundation 
for regional cooperation efforts. Nonetheless, it is worth summarizing the concrete analyses 
of the sudden interest in and emergence of a regional cooperation framework in the form of 
formal institutions before analyzing the shape that East Asian regionalism currently takes. 
3.  NEW REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA 
3.1  The Origin of Regional Institution Building in East Asia 
How can we begin to understand the sudden emergence of regional economic institutions in 
East Asia since the late 1990s? This topic has fascinated international relations scholars for 
the last ten years.
9 Starting from the challenges resulting from the Asian financial crisis, the 
visible rise of regional institutional building efforts has been attributed to various sources and 
the arguments can be divided into four categories: New Institutional Economics, geopolitics, 
Asian identity, and domestic politics.
10 
The first category variously attributes the rise of new regionalism in East Asia to the region’s 
economic statecraft, the region’s insulation under globalization, and/or the rise of Factory 
Asia. Following North’s (1981) footsteps, some scholars argue that institutions adapt to a 
changing economic environment and transform to reduce transaction costs. Economic 
maturity among the East Asian countries, along with the global trade and financial 
challenges that would disrupt the region’s economic growth and stability, is fundamental in 
motivating the governments to establish regional arrangements. Regionalism strategies are 
born of both proactive incentives and defensive incentives. On the one hand, emerging 
Factory Asia triggered strong interest in the free trade area in East Asia as production and 
business networks expanded throughout Southeast Asia (Baldwin 2006). As Munakata 
(2006b) discusses in her book, governments have slowly begun to respond to business-led 
regional economic integration that has preceded policy actions. Meanwhile, defensive 
instincts have also been at play. Obviously, the Asian financial crisis has made Asian 
leaders realize the inadequacy of the region’s financial cooperation (Wesley 1999). The lack 
of regional provisions and weakening global trade regime under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are important in the emergence of the strong bilateral free trade 
agreement (FTA) push in East Asia since the late 1990s (Dent 2003; Ravenhill 2003). East 
                                                  
9 Many books and articles have been published in this area in the field of political science and international 
relations. The books include Pempel (2005), Lincoln (2004), Rozman (2004), Munakata (2006a), Aggarwal et al. 
(2008), and Katztenstein and Shiraishi (2006). 
10 Solingen (2008) has neatly synthesized contrasting views—neorealism accounts, neoliberal institutionalism, 
domestic politics arguments, and constructivist approach—regarding regionalism, and she emphasizes the need 
for discerning the genesis, design, and effects of those institutions. In her empirical studies, domestic politics 
weigh heavily on both the genesis and design of regional institutions. 
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Asia can be considered variously as the object of a positive demonstration effect, the 
successful emulation of FTAs implemented in other regions (Ravenhill 2003), or the object of 
the defensive “domino effect” (Baldwin 1995). 
The second category of arguments focuses on the changing geopolitics after the end of the 
Cold War, specifically in the context of the rapid rise of the PRC. Closely analyzing the 
regionalism debates among the major powers in the region as the Cold War ended, Rozman 
(2004: 3) puts forth a rather pessimistic prognosis on the success of regionalism across 
Northeast Asia due to what he calls “insufficient globalization (i.e., resistance to openness 
and a lack of trust of the outside).” Many observers of East Asian regionalism reach a similar 
conclusion, emphasizing the limits of regional cooperation, that because of the historical 
mistrust between the two regional hegemons, the PCR and Japan, exclusive East Asian 
regional cooperation is doomed (Lincoln 2004). More optimistically however, the contributors 
to Pempel’s (2005) edited volume note that East Asia is now driven to cooperate and to 
redraw a rather more coherent regional map for itself. Aggarwal et al. (2008) note that the 
end of the Cold War, the end of the Asian financial crisis, and the September 11 attacks 
were three shocks that created space in which a new regional policy equilibrium could be 
created.
11 On the regional financial front, Grimes (2009) focuses on the distinctive interests 
of the three big powers (the US, the PRC, and Japan) in shaping the contours of financial 
regionalism in East Asia. 
The third category concentrates the discussion on the changing and emerging Asian identity 
through socialization. One of the influential theories on international cooperation focuses on 
the emergence of an epistemic community (Haas 1992), and the even more encompassing, 
emerging security community (Deutsch et al. 1957) is known to influence the way states 
interact with each other. Many scholars focus on East Asia’s leaders and policymakers who 
are forging strong relationships and networks in various issue areas. There seems to be a 
variety of views regarding the source of such a regional identity; some argue that it comes 
from the nostalgia for the withering “developmental state” model of development (Hatch 
2002; Bowles 2000), others argue in support of the emerging “Asian way” of communication 
and business (Acharya 2004), and still others would attribute it to the creation of “the other” 
particularly in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (Lee 2006). Of course, the contagion 
effects experienced during the Asian financial crisis have also made East Asian leaders 
realize the common fate that they would face in an economically integrated region.
12 Going 
beyond the elite level, Shiraishi (2006) emphasizes the importance of the emerging middle 
class in East Asia, thanks to rapid economic development and democratization, as the 
source of new Asia. This social transformation has led to increasing cross-border 
communication among East Asian countries through media, internet, and tourism, which has 
resulted in expansion of the subnational regional network of exchanges, creating a support 
base for liberalization and regional cooperation. 
Domestic politics, the final category, remain relevant for how regional institutional 
architectures are set up. Pekkenen, Solis, and Katada (2007) argue that a state shifted from 
privileging multilateral trade forums to privileging bilateral FTAs because of domestic politics, 
were, at the expense of the large trade gains of a multilateral forum, gaining government 
control of the agenda, as well as control over partner selection. As domestic pressure 
against liberalization mounts on a democratic government, the government starts to turn to 
bilateral forums to control negotiation dynamics. On the financial side, Hiwatari (2003) 
argues that the lack of regional coherence in the financial arrangement in East Asia emerges 
from differences in preferences of the member countries stemming from the individual 
features of their respective financial systems (prominence of direct versus indirect finance) 
and capital account positions (capital dependent versus capital supplier). MacIntyre, Pempel, 
                                                  
11 Ravenhill (2008) discusses how the turning points in regional cooperation were defined and influenced by 
those three shocks. 
12 I would like to thank Rodolfo Severino for pointing this out during the ADBI conference. 
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and Ravenhill (2008) introduced in their recent edited volume that the Asian financial crisis 
has had a catalytic impact on the economic governance of many governments in East Asia 
and has triggered a desire towards insulation from global forces. 
Scholars have, from various perspectives, paid attention to the emergence of East Asian 
regionalism over the last ten years as they attempt to explain the origin and limits of the 
phenomenon in East Asia. As the institutions evolve, it becomes increasingly important to 
analyze closely the nature of the institutions as they stand now and examine the political 
underpinning of the shape they are taking. 
3.2  Politics of Regional Institutions 
It is not easy to define what constitutes the elements that allow effective regional cooperation 
in search of regional prosperity and stability, and the analysis surrounding the effectiveness 
of regional institutions is vastly underdeveloped in comparison to the theories of nation-state 
or the international system.
13 Furthermore, direct comparison of regional institutions tends to 
become superficial because of the particularity of the regional contexts in which those 
institutions have emerged. Nonetheless, because Europe spearheaded regional institution 
building after the end of World War II, much of the analysis on regional institution building 
has come from the European experience.
14 Within this body of work, Balassa’s (1961) 
influential book has long provided a stylized view (the “logical roadmap”) regarding the 
sequence of regional integration from free trade agreements (no trade barriers across 
borders), to customs union (a free trade area protected by a common external tariff), to 
common market (free cross-boarder movement of not only goods but also factors of 
production, namely capital and labor), to economic and monetary union (including 
macroeconomic policy coordination and single currency), and finally to political union. 
Balassa’s prediction has nicely resonated with the way in which the European Economic 
Community progressed into the Single Market and then transformed into the European 
Union in the 1990s, introducing its single currency in 1999. Neofunctionalists have 
incorporated the dynamic evolution of regional integration by conceptualizing “spillovers” 
(Haas 1958). One of the spillover channels, functional spillover, triggers an expanding 
coverage of issues in regional integration efforts, as the lowering of trade barriers across 
boarders and increased trade creates externalities in the form of heightened demands for 
lower transaction costs (for example, exchange rate risks, unstandardized measurement and 
legal standards, health and other standards) and of expanded common challenges 
(environmental challenges, public health consideration, etc.). 
However, de-emphasized in such functional logic are the heavy political factors both at the 
international and domestic level, which have sometimes promoted and other times delayed 
institutional development in Europe.
15  This paper focuses on three political elements, 
extracted from the European experience, that have been crucial in establishing a stable 
regional arrangement. Of course, these three elements do not constitute an exhaustive list of 
                                                  
13 For example, Tilly (1990) gives a functional explanation of the formation of nation-state, while Anderson (1991) 
argues the “imagined community” to be the foundation of such a construct. In terms of the international system, 
there has been a continued debate between neorealists (Waltz 1979) and neoliberalists (Keohane and Nye 
1977).  
14 Scholars have explained the phenomena from competing perspectives—from neofunctionalism (Haas 1958) to 
intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991). For a brief overview, see Mattli (1999). Comparative regionalism 
theories are summarized nicely in Choi and Caporaso (2001). Mansfield and Milner (1999) also have a 
comprehensive summary regarding the theory and practice of regionalism. Numerous scholars discussed the 
characteristics of this “new” regionalism in the 1990s, for example, Hurrell (1995), and Ethier (1998). 
15 The European Union has multiple layers of institutions, some of which house sovereign influence such as the 
European Council, which has a qualified majority voting system. Much of the policies are made through the 
Council, whose implementation is passed down to the European bureaucracy, the European Commission. In 
addition, the European Parliament (whose members are elected directly by the European people) has been 
strengthened in recent years to counter the criticism of there being a democratic deficit in the EU’s policymaking. 
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essential elements for successful regional institution building, but at least they are logical 
and fundamental elements that resonate with rational institutional design (Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal 2001). 
The first element is the levels and ways in which each government is willing to give up 
national sovereignty and policy autonomy for the sake of smoother cooperation and 
integration at the regional level.
16 The more formal regional cooperation becomes, as the 
number of legally-binding agreements increases, the more a government has to compromise 
its sovereignty and policy autonomy in favor of the regional effort. From the Treaty of Rome 
(in 1957) to the Single European Act (in 1986) to the Maastrict Treaty (in 1994), Europe has 
widened and strengthened the legal agreements to unite the region through movements in 
goods, to movements of services, people and business, to uniting the macroeconomic and 
monetary policies. Meanwhile, the European Court of Justice, set up in 1952, has served to 
make sure that the EU laws are interpreted and applied in the same way in all the EU 
member countries. Although all those institutional arrangements allow the European 
integration efforts to move forward, there is no doubt that the integration proceeds at the 
expense of policy autonomy on the part of the member states.
17 
The second element that clearly has a high cost but also a large pay-off is for the regional 
institution to set up a redistributive mechanism to help those who stand to lose through 
integration and those countries that lag behind, particularly economically, during the process. 
As noted by economists and political economists, economic liberalization tends to create 
social cleavages between those who stand to gain and those who stand to lose. At the 
domestic level, the winner-versus-loser dynamic influences each government’s stance on 
liberalization. In the area of trade, the negative and positive impact of trade liberalization can 
be demarcated clearly on the basis of factors of production owner and class (Rogowski 
1989), or on the types of industry (Schattschneider 1935).
18 Hence, the trade policy of a 
country produces winner and loser groups, both of which are motivated to engage in 
collective action to influence government policy in pursuit of either protection or further 
liberalization. In the context of regional preferential trade liberalization, Milner (1997) argues 
that the preferences of increasing returns to scale industries such as aircraft manufacturers 
push strongly in favor of expanding their production and market scope as long as they do not 
have to face foreign competitors. Thus, argues Milner, the increasing returns to scale 
industries tend to prefer regional free trade where the industry can capture economies of 
scale without having to face stiff foreign competition (for example, Boeing would rather 
capture the regional market in the Western Hemisphere than compete globally where Airbus 
from Europe would compete against it). Policymakers and politicians balance industry 
demands with the levels of tariff revenues and consumer surplus to produce a preference 
towards regionalism. In the realm of finance and monetary affairs, however, such domestic 
cleavage is less clear or direct. Frieden (1991) takes up this ambitious challenge and 
examines the winners and losers of increased cross-border capital mobility. As capital 
market integration proceeds, mobile and non-sector-specific capital is able to move. This 
benefits the owners of mobile (financial) capital in a capital abundant country and present 
                                                  
16 In legal terms, sovereignty is defined as “the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which an 
independent state is governed and from which all specific political powers are derived; the intentional 
independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign 
interference” (West’s Encyclopedia of American Law). Meanwhile, policy autonomy refers to a government’s 
freedom to determine its own actions and behavior. 
17 Legalization is not necessarily an indispensable tool of regional cooperation. Kahler (2000) argues that East 
Asian governments tend to resort to legalism as needed. 
18  Hiscox (2001) synthesizes those two views and argues that this difference between class cleavage and 
industry cleavage comes from the level (speed) of factor mobility. When cross-industry factor mobility is high, 
industries adjust to open trade utilizing abundant factors, thus winner-versus-loser cleavage emerges based on 
the owners of factors of production (i.e., labor and capital) and, therefore, class. Meanwhile, when the factor 
mobility is low, each industry becomes a winner or loser depending on its own competitiveness in the open 
economy. 
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challenges for the owners of sector-specific capital in a capital scarce country. In most 
advanced economies, financial capital would be managed by financial institutions such as 
transnational banks and institutional investors, while sector-specific capital would be in the 
hands of the individual sectors such as manufacturing, farming or real estate. On the stability 
and level of exchange rates, Frieden (1991) produced a two-by-two matrix where a less 
flexible exchange rate regime (that one would expect to see under regional monetary 
cooperation) would benefit export-oriented producers when the currency is weak, and 
international traders and investors when the currency is strong.
19 
At the regional level, it is critical to create as “leveled playing field” as possible among the 
members by compensating the less developed. Even though the Common Agricultural Policy 
in Europe, which currently uses slightly less than half of the EU budget, is often cited as a 
major vice associated with the region’s integration efforts (by buying off the French farmers), 
this type of measure allows governments to sign on to the integration project despite strong 
domestic opposition. Furthermore, regional institutions should house a mechanism through 
which the income level of less affluent or less developed countries can be pulled up in order 
to minimize the income discrepancy in the region, a discrepancy that could encourage both a 
race to the bottom and a capacity gap in the region. The Europeans have long tackled this 
challenge through the Cohesion and Regional Policy, based on which the Regional Structure 
Fund and Cohesion Fund are distributed to less-developed members of the EU. These 
policy instruments allow regional integration and its associated institution to develop through 
functional logic with less political opposition. 
The third element is the willingness on the part of the governments in the region to clearly 
define the membership. That is, who is in and who is out. This element is also closely related 
to the second element, where it helps to define the membership for the purpose of 
redistribution in order to reduce both domestic and regional resistance to further integration. 
Meanwhile, if the constructivist perspective (the third perspective regarding regional identity 
giving rise to regionalism in East Asia) has something to contribute to our understanding of 
regional cooperation in East Asia, it is important for the leadership pushing the regional 
integration forward to define with whom they are cooperating, and from whom they are 
distancing themselves. Of course, for the Western Europeans, in the context of the Cold War 
since the late 1940s, it was very easy to define who they were with and who they were 
against. As the challenge of defining themselves has become more intense with the end of 
the Cold War and with aggressive enlargement from 12 members in 1987 to 27 by 2007, the 
institutional arrangement of the EU accession criteria and accession procedures help define 
who can join and who cannot.
20 
These three elements serve to provide the political basis for increasing the functional 
expansion of and commitment to regional integration. In the next section, the study turns to 
the two aspects of a region’s economic cooperation efforts, one in finance and one in trade, 
to examine how these arrangements fare in supporting functional progress in East Asia. 
                                                  
19 Meanwhile, a more flexible exchange rate (which would increase monetary policy autonomy for the country 
according to the Mundell-Fleming condition or the Unholy trinity of exchange rate stability and macroeconomic 
policy autonomy under the world of full capital mobility) would benefit import-competing producers of tradable 
goods when the exchange rate is low, and would benefit producers of non-tradable goods when the exchange 
rate is high. 
20 All the EU accession candidates have to agree to and implement all the EU laws. The (EU) acquis consists of 
35 chapters that cover a variety of subjects ranging from the movement of goods to foreign and security policies. 
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4.  REGIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTION BUILDING IN 
EAST ASIA 
4.1  Regional Financial Cooperation and Institutions 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, efforts to provide an institutional base for 
regional financial cooperation developed very quickly in East Asia. The experience of the 
crisis prompted these efforts, which aim to make sure that such a financial disaster will never 
happen again. Despite all three aspects of regional financial and monetary architecture 
being essential for securing maximum financial and monetary stability in the region, the 
emergency liquidity funding arrangement of currency swaps under the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI) has become the most institutionalized, while the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) 
and Asian Bond Fund (ABF) are moving forward slowly and informally. There is currently 
very little movement in the area of monetary and currency cooperation in the form of an 
Asian Monetary Union or an Asian Currency Unit (ACU). 
Both in terms of chronology and level of institutionalization, the CMI is the most well-
established financial initiative in East Asia at the moment. As early as November 1997, the 
East Asian governments launched a regional framework in the context of Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (Japan, PRC, and South Korea (hereafter 
Korea)) with the hope of dealing with financial emergencies. This framework became the 
core of the region’s emergency liquidity mechanism consisting of a network of mostly 
bilateral currency swap arrangements. The ASEAN Plus Three governments arrived at the 
basic agreement regarding this regional mechanism by May 2002.
21 One component of the 
CMI is the expanded ASEAN Swap Agreement, a small regional currency swap facility that 
has existed among ASEAN members since 1977. The other, more recent components are 
the Bilateral Swap Arrangements and the repurchase arrangements between each member 
of the ASEAN Plus Three.
22 The CMI has two basic objectives: the first is to provide 
emergency liquidity at a time of financial crisis, such as the Asian financial crisis. The second 
and longer-term goal is to enhance regional cooperation both in terms of currency 
stabilization and financial monitoring. As of June 2009, US$90 billion worth of swap lines 
have been committed by the participating monetary authorities. 
In May 2009, the decision to multilateralize (i.e., regionalize) the CMI was finalized, and in 
the near future the funds already committed to bilateral swap lines will be pooled to create a 
potential for a much larger swap volume per use.
23 The newly established CMIM (Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralized) will consist of a multilateral private swap agreement among the 
member central banks with a pooled fund of US$120 billion. Through the multilateralization 
process, not only did the amount available for each swap expand, but it also allowed the 
ASEAN countries that were not incorporated into either the Bilateral Swap Arrangements or 
                                                  
21 The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) takes its name from a town in Northern Thailand where an ASEAN Plus Three 
meeting was held in 2000, during which the CMI proposal was made . It took two more years for most of the 
bilateral swap arrangements to be negotiated and agreed. 
22  Note, though, that the less advanced and newer ASEAN members (Viet Nam, Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, and Myanmar) are only covered by the ASEAN Swap Agreement, and do not have bilateral 
lines of currency swap with the Plus Three countries. 
23 The multilateralization process started in May 2007 when the monetary authorities of the member countries 
agreed at the ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers’ meeting in Kyoto to gradually establish “a self-managed 
reserve pooling arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement.” (Point 6 of the Joint Ministerial 
Statement of the 10
th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, available:  http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/ 
as3_070505.htm [accessed 15 November 2007]). At the 11
th ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers’ Meeting in 
Madrid in May 2008, the 13 members agreed then to move forward with the multilateralization as they committed 
to discuss specific conditions on “economic surveillance, borrowing accessibility, activation mechanism, decision 
making rules and lending covenants.” (Point 6 of the Joint Ministerial Statement of the 11
th ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting, available: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/as3_080504.htm [accessed 1 February 2009]). 
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ASEAN Swap Agreement to become full members of the CMI process (namely Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam). Despite the 
large amount of available funds and the image of the “revival” of the Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) proposed by the Japanese authority at the onset of the Asian financial crisis in the 
summer of 1997, there are two features that clearly distinguish the CMIM from the (relatively 
vaguely defined) AMF. 
The first is the fact that the CMI so far has been a virtual institution. The recent agreement 
will lead the CMIM to establish a more formal institution to engage in the monitoring and 
surveillance of member countries in preparation for the activation of currency swaps, but it is 
unlikely that this will turn into a large standing institution, and nor does it consist of an actual 
pool of funds in the same way that the International Monetary Fund does. The currency 
swap arrangements are based on a contractual agreement among the central banks to 
activate those swaps based on their respective foreign exchange reserves as the CMIM 
receives requests.
24 The other feature of the CMIM is the IMF-link as a condition to activate 
the currency swaps. This 90% link (i.e., 90% of the swap can only be activated when the IMF 
agreement is either negotiated or in place) was put in place at the establishment of the CMI 
due to the lack of a monitoring function under the ASEAN Plus Three framework. Without 
this link, deciding to activate a swap line and guaranteeing repayment becomes difficult.
25 
The explicit definition of the CMIM as a complementary liquidity funding mechanism within 
the international framework led by the IMF did not emerge solely from the lessons of the 
failed AMF,
26 it was established to make sure that repayment on the part of borrowers is 
secured through international pressure. A regional monitoring and surveillance mechanism 
has also been developed through the search for a way to prevent a financial crisis from 
occurring, and if it does, the borrowers can be monitored closely. The financial ministries of 
the member governments have, since the start of the CMI process, worked on those 
functions in the form of a biannual meeting of the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, but 
the CMIM has already promised to develop a more specific surveillance function to allow the 
advisory panel to activate the swaps.
27 
The current global financial crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers of September 2008 
helped the multilateralization of the CMI by making the leading countries compromise on and 
commit to a common regional goal.
28 Despite such regional success, however, the monetary 
authorities of the countries with large foreign exchange reserves, namely the PRC and 
Japan, have established their own respective bilateral swap arrangements using their own 
currency (yuan and yen) besides the CMIM.
29 
                                                  
24 An interview with a Ministry of Finance (Japan) official in June 2009. 
25 The IMF-link was later reduced to 80% at the 8
th ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers’ meeting in Istanbul in 
2005. The PRC government is said to have insisted on the IMF-link not only for the two purposes discussed, but 
also to curtail the power of the Japanese government in influencing the CMI’s development. 
26 The AMF alleged to have failed partly due to the view that it would be challenging the IMF authority. 
27   Point 9 of the summary of the statement of the 12
th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, 
available: http://www.aseansec.org/22536.htm [accessed 20 June 2009]. 
28  The agreement of the amount of contribution between the People’s Republic of China (32% including the 
contribution from Hong Kong, China) and Japan (32%) was the key to settling the multilateralization process. 
Furthermore, the strong need for financial monitoring was felt as the Korean government refused to acknowledge 
that it was facing a balance of payment crisis (and thus did not request to activate the CMI) in the fall of 2008. 
Interview with a Ministry of Finance (Japan) official, June 2009. 
29 The first of such bilateral swap arrangements was between Japan and the Republic of Korea on 12 December 
2008 that added $17 billion worth of yen/won swap lines besides the existing $87 billion in the CMI. The Republic 
of Korea also added $10 billion to its swap with the PRC. Beyond that, the Japanese government has committed 
$60 billion (worth in yen) of swap lines within Asia, while the PRC is reported to have committed $95 billion (in 
yuan) worldwide. 
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The ABMI, in the context of the ASEAN Plus Three, also directly addresses the regional 
need for financial stability, a lesson that unmistakably came from the Asian financial crisis. 
The Asian financial crisis revealed the financial vulnerability of the East Asian economies 
ranging from domestic financial weakness to an inefficient investment climate. The challenge 
of the double mismatch problem, which came about as East Asia borrowed short-term in 
dollars and invested long-term in assets denominated in their local currency, has imposed 
more costs and risks on the borrowers in East Asia. As a region with relatively high savings, 
there was an emerging sense that “surplus savings from East Asia [flowing] out of the region 
to Western financial markets and then return[ing] by way of loans to Asian 
borrowers…makes little economic sense”
 (Rowley 2003). 
The idea of the Asian bond market emerged first from Thailand in the summer of 2002. The 
creation of a bond market requires both issuers of bonds and investors in those bonds. The 
Thai initiative focused mainly on the investor side as then-Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra, proposed that the members of ASEAN Plus Three contribute 1% of each 
country’s respective foreign exchange reserves to launch a regional fund to purchase Asian 
bonds. The idea, which was discussed at the East Asia Economic Summit in Kuala Lumpur 
in October 2002, was developed and adopted by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia 
Pacific Central Banks as they set up the ABF, which was formally announced in June of 
2003. As the central banks of eleven Asia-Pacific countries (including Australia and New 
Zealand) pledged US$1 billion for the purchase of semi-sovereign and sovereign bonds from 
less advanced countries (i.e., not Japan, Australia, or New Zealand) in the region. At this 
stage, the bonds that this fund had purchased were all US dollar-denominated. In June 
2005, however, as the second phase of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF2) was launched, the 
fund used US$2 billion to invest in bonds denominated in Asian currencies.
30 
On the other hand, the Japanese government from the early stage of the Asian bond 
discussion was interested in developing a regional and local bond market in East Asia with 
the focus on the issuers. As early as the time of the New Miyazawa Initiative (October 1998), 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was interested in supporting local bond market development 
to tap into local savings and avoid a heavy reliance on foreign capital. In December 2002, 
Japan officially proposed the idea of the ABMI at an ASEAN Plus Three meeting in Thailand. 
The aims of the ABMI are two-fold: to facilitate access to the market through a wider variety 
of issuers, and to enhance market infrastructure to foster bond markets in Asia (Ministry of 
Finance).
31 Under this initiative, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation extends bond 
guarantees to local-currency denominated bonds. Six working groups under the ABMI 
umbrella are working to establish a market infrastructure including a regional bond-rating 
system.
32 The Japanese government also extends technical assistance in the development 
of a local bond market in some ASEAN countries utilizing Japanese foreign aid. 
Furthermore, the new ABMI Roadmap, which includes an insurance mechanism, the facility 
to increase the demand of local currency-denominated bonds, an improved regulatory 
framework, and a related infrastructure for the bond markets, was endorsed at the 2008 
Madrid meeting. 
The currency and exchange rate arrangement (the other element of the double mismatch) 
constitutes the last necessary component of East Asia’s regional financial cooperation. 
                                                  
30 Currently, ABF3 is being discussed. The third phase of ABF aims at providing credit enhancement to sovereign 
and private Asian bonds. (Rowley 2005). 
31   Ministry of Finance, “Regional Financial Cooperation among ASEAN+3” (http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/ 
regional_financial_cooperation.htm#ABMI, accessed 6 May 2009). 
32  The six working groups are: New securitized debt instruments (WG1); Credit guarantee and investment 
mechanisms (WG2); Foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues (WG3); Issuance of bonds 
denominated in local currencies by multilateral development banks, foreign government agencies, and Asian 
multinational corporations (WG4); Rating systems and information dissemination on Asian bond markets (WG5); 
and Technical assistance coordination (WG6). 
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Because of high and increasing regional economic interdependence in the mid-1980s, the 
dollar–yen exchange rate volatility (e.g., the depreciation of the yen to the US dollar after the 
spring of 1995) also put pressure on many Asian economies in the 1990s. After the de-
pegging of the baht in the summer of 1997, some East Asian countries, most of whose 
currencies used to be pegged one way or another to the US dollar, floated their currencies. 
Being highly dependent on their investment and trade, the East Asian governments were 
eager to see their exchange rates stabilize (Kuroda and Kawai 2004). As Japan’s first efforts 
to increase the use of the yen in the region did not bear much fruit, East Asia has gradually 
started to entertain the possibility of regional monetary cooperation, even of a monetary 
union. 
As the first step towards the Asian Monetary Union, economists and policymakers in East 
Asia conducted a joint study with the European Union (the Kobe Research Group) that 
published its report in July of 2002 and recommended a monetary integration process for 
phase one (to be completed by 2010); preparation for a single currency for phase two (to be 
completed by 2030); and the launching of a single currency in phase three that would start in 
2030 (Institute for International Monetary Affairs 2004). The second and most current 
initiative is related to the idea of the ACU, initially discussed in late 2005 by the newly 
expanded Office of Regional Economic Integration at the Asian Development Bank under 
the leadership of its then-director Masahiro Kawai, and the new Asian Development Bank 
president Haruhiko Kuroda. The proposed ACU models itself after the European Currency 
Unit that existed as the region’s currency unit before the introduction of the euro. The 
European Currency Unit constituted a unit of exchange based on the weighted average of 
values of a basket of currencies. The ACU idea was picked up by the ASEAN Plus Three at 
the finance ministers’ meeting in May 2006, where all thirteen participating governments 
agreed to conduct in-depth research on its feasibility.
33 One thing to note here, however, is 
that monetary cooperation at this stage has not given rise to discussion on convergence 
criteria or explicit macroeconomic policy coordination, which would be necessary in 
managing the stable exchange rates among the countries whose capital movement is 
relatively free (i.e., Mundell-Fleming Condition or Unholy Trinity).
34 Moreover, despite the 
concerns over global imbalance and the high dollar-dependence of East Asia, the currency 
discussion in the region has not yet converged into concrete actions. 
Regional financial and monetary cooperation in the last ten years has established a relatively 
clear membership. Given the experience of the Asian financial crisis, the question of who is 
in and who is out is easily answered. In this context, regional cooperation includes a 
mechanism to protect vulnerable countries with relatively low foreign currency reserves and 
financial capacity to acquire access to emergency liquidity funding and technical assistance 
in developing their financial markets. Meanwhile, as seen in the progress within the three 
areas of financial and monetary cooperation, there is still strong resistance against a country 
compromising its policy autonomy. The regional currency discussion, though fundamental in 
addressing the dollar dependence and ultimate stability in regional financial affairs, is 
progressing very slowly and, at this point, quite superficially without much commitment from 
the monetary authorities of the region. Furthermore, the protection of sovereignty over 
monetary affairs is strikingly clear even in how the CMIM is set up differently from the 
envisioned AMF.
35 
                                                  
33 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5 May 2006. 
34 The idea that has been most widely floated in Japan in terms of this current unit arrangement is to use the unit 
for financial and macroeconomic policy monitoring purposes. 
35 Cooper (2007) also notes that the main reason why we see more trade cooperation in regions than monetary 
cooperation is that governments are most protective of their macroeconomic policy autonomy and monetary 
sovereignty. 
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4.2  Regional Trade Cooperation and FTAs 
Despite increasing the amount of intra-regional trade in East Asia, it was only after the Asian 
financial crisis that East Asian governments began to actively seek preferential trade 
agreements. East Asia’s major economic powers, which have prospered continuously from 
their successful exports to the rest of the world, have been staunch supporters of the 
multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization 
(WTO) regime. Even as many parts of the world began to aggressively negotiate preferential 
trade agreements in the 1990s, and as the US shocked the world by establishing FTAs with 
Canada (1989) and Mexico (1994), East Asian countries faithfully kept their loyalty to trade 
multilateralism by supporting the GATT/WTO process. With the exception of ASEAN, which 
began its first steps towards a free trade area in 1992, the only other visible free trade 
negotiations that many East Asian governments engaged in was through the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), a loosely organized forum that in the mid-1990s established 
its goals to facilitate and liberalize regional trade by 2010 for advanced countries and by 
2020 for its developing members.
36 Nonetheless, towards the late 1990s as the FTA frenzy 
expanded throughout the world and East Asian economic powers became the only 
remaining few without any FTAs, pressure was mounted vis-à-vis those governments by 
industries demanding government action to avoid a total FTA exclusion.
37 
The shift in these governments’ trade policy was also motivated by both regional and global 
challenges. The regional challenge was not directly linked to the Asian financial crisis, but 
first emerged as APEC’s trade liberalization through the Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization miserably fell apart in 1997 (Krauss 2004). Moreover, it did not help when 
APEC failed to effectively address the Asian financial crisis (Wesley 1999). In the late 1990s, 
the multilateral trade regime under the WTO also began to face challenges from its own 
weight of success as its membership expanded rapidly including many developing countries 
around the Pacific Rim, and the issues left to be discussed such as agricultural liberalization 
became more contentious and political. Nineteen ninety-nine was the year when the trade 
liberalization forces of the WTO were confronted directly and visibly with counterforces at its 
Ministerial meeting in Seattle. Since then, despite the launching of the Doha Development 
Round and the admission of the PRC into the WTO in 2001, trade liberalization negotiation 
at the WTO level has stagnated. 
Under those global and regional circumstances, East Asia started to rush into FTA 
negotiations in the early 2000s. Many of the first steps towards FTAs were taken as 
feasibility studies of those FTAs among sets of countries. One of the earliest cases for Japan 
was the proposal by the then-Korean President Kim Dae-Jung during his visit to Japan in 
October 1998 to conduct studies with the hope of negotiating Japan–Korea bilateral FTAs. A 
proposal from Mexico towards a Japan–Mexico FTA emerged at around the same time. 
From Southeast Asia, Singapore spearheaded the region’s FTA boom first by engaging in 
FTA negotiations with New Zealand in 1999, and soon after the Singaporean government 
began exploring FTA possibilities with Mexico, Chile, and Korea. The FTA negotiations in 
East Asia picked up pace in the fall of 2000. Japan’s FTA overture to Singapore, which had 
already started in late 1999 as joint FTA studies between the two countries, upgraded itself 
to an official negotiation in October 2000. After one year of negotiations, the Japan–
                                                  
36  APEC is an arrangement that is very difficult to categorize as a “regional” institution. Not only does it 
encompass 21 countries from Australia, to Malaysia, to the PRC, to Russia, to the US, to Peru and Chile, it does 
not operate under the same binding obligations as typical FTAs do. In addition, under its “open regionalism” 
principle, the APEC members make their agreement consistent with the GATT/WTO, and extend the preferential 
trade access not only to the members but also to non-members. 
37 Baldwin (1995) discusses the domino theory of preferential trade agreements, where industries of countries 
that are excluded from the FTA network will lobby hard to get their government to launch FTAs so as not to suffer 
from trade diversion. Solis, Stallings, and Katada (2009) find that competitive pressure both economic and 
political triggered many East Asian governments to rush into FTAs, thus leading to FTA proliferation. 
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Singapore New Age Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in January 2002, and 
after ratification in both countries, it came into effect in November 2002. During this time, the 
US proposed an FTA with Singapore. More importantly for the region, the then-Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed in November 2000 to start exploring the possibility of an FTA 
between the PRC and ASEAN. The framework agreement on this Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation between the two entities was signed within two years, leading the PRC to offer 
early harvest measures to individual ASEAN members as it opens its market up for certain 
products before schedule. For Korea, Chile became its FTA partner, with the negotiations 
starting in September of 1999, and the agreement came into effect in 2004.
38 
Since this initial stage, the FTA proliferation in East Asia is striking. As of December 2008, 
the ASEAN Plus Three members have signed or put into effect a total of 39 bilateral and 
plurateral FTAs with partners within and beyond the region, and many more are currently 
being negotiated or are under study (see table). 
East Asian FTAs as of December 2008 
   Immediate Neighbor  Within the "Region"  Cross Region  
Republic of 
Korea  Japan (under negotiation)  Singapore (in force 2006)  Chile (in force 2004) 
  
People’s Republic of China 
(under study)  ASEAN (in force 2007)  EFTA (in force 2006) 
        United States (signed 2007) 
        Canada (negotiation) 
        EU (negotiation) 
        Mexico (negotiation) 
        India (negotiation) 
        Australia (negotiation) 
        Russia (study) 
        Mercosur (study) 
         Republic of South Africa (study) 
Japan  ASEAN Plus Six (initiative)  Singapore (in force 2002)  Mexico (in force 2005) 
  
Republic of Korea 
(negotiation suspended)  Malaysia (in force 2006)  Chile (in force 2007) 
      Philippines (signed 2006)  GCC (negotiation) 
      Thailand (in force 2007)  Switzerland (negotiation) 
      Indonesia (in force 2008)  Australia (negotiation)  
      ASEAN (signed 2008)  India (negotiation) 
     
Brunei Darussalam (in 
force 2008)  Peru (negotiation) 




The Macau Special 
Administrative Region (in 
force 2004)  ASEAN (2005)  Chile (in force 2006) 
  
Hong Kong, China (in force 
2004)  Singapore (negotiation)  Pakistan (in force 2007) 
   Japan–Korea (study)    New Zealand (in force 2008) 
   Japan (study)    GCC (negotiation) 
   Republic of Korea (study)    Iceland (negotiation) 
        SACU (negotiation announced) 
        Australia (negotiation) 
        Peru (negotiation) 
        India (study) 
      
                                                  
38 For a good summary of the FTA boom in East Asia, see Munakata (2006a, chapters 6 and 7). 
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   Immediate Neighbor  Within the "Region"  Cross Region  
Singapore     Japan (in force 2002)   New Zealand (in force 2001) 
     
Republic of Korea (in force 
2006)   Australia (in force 2003) 
        EFTA (in force 2003) 
        US (in force 2004)  
        Jordan (in force 2005) 
        India (in force 2005) 
        Panama (in force 2006)  
        Peru (signed 2008)  
Thailand 
Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (in force 1991) 
People’s Republic of 
China (in force 2003)  Australia (in force 2005) 
      Japan (in force 2007) 
Bahrain (framework agreed 
2002) 
      Bangladesh, India, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Bhutan (negotiation 
2004) 
Croatia (proposal 2001) 
     
Czech Republic (proposal 
2001) 
        Peru (signed 2005) 
        India (signed 2003) 
        US (negotiation 2004) 
        New Zealand (in force 2005) 
Malaysia      Japan (in force 2006)  Pakistan (in force 2008) 
     
People’s Republic of 
China (in force 2000)  India (negotiation) 
     
Republic of Korea 
(negotiation) US  (negotiation) 
        Chile (negotiation) 
        Australia (negotiation) 
         New Zealand (negotiation) 
Indonesia     Japan (in force 2008)    
     
People’s Republic of 
China (in force 2004)    
Philippines 
State of Brunei Darussalam 
(in force 2008)  Japan (in force 2008)  US (proposal 2002) 
     
People’s Republic of 
China (negotiation)    




Republic  Thailand (in force 1991)       
Brunei 
Darussalam  Philippines (in force 2008)  Japan (in force 2008)    
Although the timing of the post-Asian financial crisis rise of trade regionalism has coincided 
with that from the financial/monetary side, regional trade cooperation exhibits strikingly 
different features from the regional financial cooperation discussed above. The first is the 
specificity of regional membership, which is very clear in the context of ASEAN Plus Three in 
finance, but is not so clear in the context of trade. The FTAs thus far have been dominated 
by bilateral agreements, and many of the early FTA partners for those East Asian 
governments are from beyond the immediate region (Solis and Katada 2007). The reasons 
for this eclectic partner selection come from various sources, but for countries like Japan and 
Korea, strong agricultural opposition to any kind of forced market opening has a strong 
bearing on the choice of countries with which they can engage in FTA negotiations. It is 
particularly so for the Japanese government which is categorized as a developed country in 
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the context of the WTO, and is thus obliged to comply with GATT article 24. Though loosely 
interpreted, the article demands that any preferential trade arrangements cover “substantially 
all trade” among the signatories. Japanese government officials are very conscious of the 
obligation, which generally requires the FTAs that Japan signs to liberalize at least 90% of 
import value. Pekkanen, Solis, and Katada (2007) argue that, in complying with the WTO 
rules, a democratic government such as Japan’s faces a “gains and control tradeoff” as the 
government chooses a forum to liberalize trade. If it seeks to maximize gains from trade, it 
cannot expect to have much control over partner selection or trade protection agendas 
(sectoral exclusions or delayed liberalization), while if the government sacrifices gains from 
trade that it can expect from a multilateral or large regional trade liberalization forum (such 
as through the WTO or APEC) and opts to engage in an FTA with a smaller partner, it will 
obtain a high level of control over the agendas. The latter choice can minimize domestic 
opposition. In that context, as expanded below, an East Asia-wide FTA is yet to emerge. 
East Asian governments have used cross-regional bilateral FTAs as their political leverage 
to negotiate FTAs intra-regionally (Solis and Katada 2007). The governments of Japan and 
Korea among others have gained political leverage through the on-the-job training that the 
government officials experienced by engaging in FTA negotiations with their more 
experienced Latin American and European counterparts, and by creating domestic 
precedents to negotiate regional FTAs more aggressively without being constrained by 
domestic politics (Katada and Solis 2008). Particularly for relatively small countries like 
Singapore or Korea, in establishing an FTA with the US, these Asian countries can not only 
acquire preferential access to the largest and most important market in the world, but they 
can also increase their prestige and leverage by becoming regional trade hubs (Koo 2009; 
Terada 2009). 
The contents of the FTAs are quite eclectic, partly due to their bilateral (or hub-and-spokes) 
nature, but also due to the different positions (especially developed versus developing 
countries) and approaches to FTAs among the countries in East Asia. For example, the 
FTAs signed between Japan and its partners have a significant portion of WTO-plus 
agreements. From its first FTA with Singapore, the Japanese government preferred to call its 
arrangement an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) because it covers issues that go 
beyond liberalization of trade in goods and services, and includes agreements on 
investment, government procurements, and the movement of business and professional 
people, as well as technical cooperation in various areas such as improvements in the 
business climate. Although many of these new issues included in the EPAs are non-binding, 
the Japanese government is quite keen on highlighting that those issues are an integral part 
of Japan’s FTA relationship (Katada and Solis 2008). This feature of Japan’s EPAs clearly 
reflects the demand for FTAs between developed and developing countries, where issues 
such as investment protection and improved business environment are crucial for the 
Japanese businesses operating in these countries. Furthermore, the limited opening of 
Japan’s agricultural market to those FTA partners that are developing countries makes it 
imperative for Japan to provide more “carrots” in its FTAs with countries whose main 
competitive exports to Japan are agricultural products. The PRC, on the other hand, extends 
the measure of early harvest to ASEAN countries. 
The clash over the appropriate membership of the region-wide FTA in East Asia is an 
intriguing feature of regional trade cooperation. Contrary to the conventional argument 
carried out by international relations scholars (Mansfield and Milner 1999), the collection of 
FTAs thus far has not translated into regionalism in East Asia. The “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs 
that crisscross within and outside East Asia has become a challenge to East Asian 
integration due to complex and conflicting rules of origin, cumbersome transactions 
throughout the region, and the lack of a top-level management function (Dent 2006; Baldwin 
2006). Despite calls from regional academics, think tanks (Kawai and Wignaraja 2008), and 
some government officials (such as those in the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in 
Japan) to create a broad Asian FTA, no convergence of vision and approach has emerged. 
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So far, the closest arrangements to a region-wide FTA in East Asia are the multiple ASEAN 
Plus One FTAs where ASEAN has FTAs with PRC (framework agreed in 2002), Korea 
(2005), India (2008), and Japan (2008).
39 
There are, nonetheless, some efforts to establish a region-wide FTA. Currently, there are 
three competing region-wide FTA proposals indicating the difficulty in defining the regional 
membership. The PRC has consistently been in support of an FTA in the context of ASEAN 
Plus Three (the so-called East Asian Free Trade Area), and it tried to push the scheme as a 
supporting report presenting it at the ASEAN Plus Three Economic Ministers’ meeting in 
August of 2006. During the same month and at the East Asian Economic Ministers’ Meeting, 
the Japanese government revealed its proposal to create a free trade area among the 
ASEAN Plus Six (Japan, PRC, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand). The idea of 
constructing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia is still at the feasibility 
study stage, but a series of discussions and presentations are lined up for the East Asian 
Summit.
40 Finally, the old “competing logic of regionalism” (Ravenhill 1995) raised its head 
again as the then-US President George W. Bush proposed the Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific (FTAAP) at the annual APEC meeting in Viet Nam in November 2006. Both a section 
of the US policy makers as well as the APEC itself were looking for ways to re-energize 
APEC as a way for the US to “move back to Asia.”
41 According to Bergsten (2007), a vocal 
supporter of the FTAAP, not only would this arrangement provide the largest free trade area 
in the world, but it would also impose huge pressure on the WTO to move its Doha Round 
forward. The FTAAP would also solve the spaghetti bowl phenomena of numerous, 
disjointed bilateral FTAs that emerged in the Pacific Rim as it ties all the APEC member 
countries into one free trade area (Bergsten 2007).
42 
The rapid increase in the number of FTAs in East Asia in the first decade of the 21
st century 
has demonstrated that those governments are now willing to commit themselves to the legal 
obligation of an FTA, which of course forces them to liberalize a large part of their trade. 
FTAs often cover a wide ground including not only trade liberalization measures but also 
trade facilitation. Despite the willingness on the part of the regional governments to expand 
their FTA networks, their respective partner selection is highly eclectic. The choice itself is 
often driven by domestic political constraints and by the way in which the FTA package gets 
assembled to balance the give-and-take elements of each partnership. Given the 
particularity of the trade relationship between each partner, and therefore, the different 
configurations of domestic winners and losers, it is easier to tailor FTAs bilaterally than 
regionally. The catch here is that unless a regional solution to domestic political constraints 
is found (such as in the case of the common agricultural policy in Europe), the spaghetti 
bowl of tailored arrangements is an easier option; while the lack of a clearly defined 
membership in regional trade cooperation makes it impossible for the regional mechanism to 
address the domestic political conflict. 
                                                  
39 ASEAN also signed a close economic partnership agreement with Australia and New Zealand in 2002. 
40  Information on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia is available from the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/index.html). 
41 Since September 2008, the US has shown a strong interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement based on the P-4 (New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam) agreement 
that entered into force in 2006. US trade representatives consider the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement to be a way to reinforce transpacific trade cooperation and an important component in the 
way of defining the APEC-wide trade liberalization efforts. 
42  Aggarwal consistently criticizes the FTAAP as the US’s misguided trade policy to subvert East Asian 
integration efforts, and that it would have a detrimental effect on the global trade liberalization efforts at the WTO 
(Aggarwal 2007). 
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5.  CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
This study has examined the characteristics of developing East Asian regional cooperation 
in the areas of trade and finance from the viewpoint of the three facilitating political elements 
toward regional institution building derived from the European experience. The first political 
element was the level at which governments are willing to compromise sovereignty and 
political autonomy for the sake of regional cooperation. The second is the progress in 
creating mechanisms through which the “losers” and the “weak” within a country or region 
can be compensated. The third element was the clear definition of which members can 
benefit from such mechanisms. These three elements are useful in propelling progress in 
furthering regional cooperation and institution building because they remove resistance and 
obstacles against functional spillovers. 
The last ten years demonstrated that regional financial and monetary cooperation has been 
quite successful in addressing the financial vulnerability of the region by establishing a 
clearly defined regional emergency liquidity mechanism to prevent and counter possible 
financial crises. The ASEAN Plus Three has, however, yet to consolidate its strategy to 
tackle arguably the most important component of monetary cooperation, the dollar 
dependence. Despite active discussion and political gestures, the actual progress on this 
currency issue is quite limited. The reluctance comes as monetary cooperation will inevitably 
impose limits on the macroeconomic autonomy of each member. As discussed repeatedly 
by the euro-skeptics (who were proven wrong), national currency is one of the most 
important symbols of national unity (let alone the pragmatic benefit of seignorage), a quality 
that those East Asian countries that had struggled for independence cherish. Despite (or 
because of) the weak domestic cleavage (thus politics) that financial cooperation produces, 
the monetary authorities are quite unwilling to give up their autonomy on this front. 
Regional trade cooperation, on the other hand, suffers from too much social involvement and 
complex need to compensate the losers. A bilateral FTA is a way to make a government 
commit to trade liberalization and facilitation goals despite domestic resistance, but such 
resistance and politics inevitably makes East Asian FTAs quite tailor-made and eclectic. 
Without a clearly defined membership, the region-wide efforts to balance gains and losses 
will be difficult to implement. Thus, the patchwork of FTAs has so far been the second best 
solution to potentially much larger gains from region-wide cooperation. 
Given the idiosyncrasies of every regional integration project in the world, it is entirely 
possible that the case of regional institution building in East Asia can benefit more from 
regionally unique elements other than the three that this paper has concentrated on. These 
candidates have already emerged in existing literature focused on topics such as regional 
identity and policy network, as well as subregional and transnational relationships, and track-
two processes. Nevertheless, this study has examined the importance of those three 
elements in facilitating or hindering the progression of the region. It will be essential in the 
future to expand this analysis into regional cooperation and integration in areas other than 
trade and finance (such as regional environment, public health and transnational crimes of 
drug or human trafficking) to make the assertion more robust in the face of empirical 
analysis. 
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